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Theses
1.	 2017 saw an intensification in the discussions and actions 
aimed at strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy. 
The highlight was the activation last December of Permanent 
Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO). The 
development of the EU’s security and defence policy is sup-
ported by both France and Germany. Paris needs the EU to 
complement French power projection in its southern neigh-
bourhood. Berlin sees political value in the development of 
common security and defence policy for the EU. Central Eu-
rope perceives the whole process sceptically. 
2.	 The compromise around PESCO and the discussions on the fu-
ture of the EU’s security and defence policy have revealed wor-
rying trends in Europe. First, strategic differences between 
the member states have been laid bare, in particular between 
the three keystones of European security, France, Germany 
and Poland. Second, the process has highlighted a growing gap 
between the political rhetoric in (Western) Europe and mili-
tary reality on the ground. The political narratives about Eu-
ropean ‘strategic autonomy’ and the US’s alleged ‘withdrawal 
from Europe’ have been confronted with the glaring deficien-
cies in European military capabilities and the increase of the 
US’s military presence on the continent. 
3.	 It remains an open question as to what the appropriate Europe-
an response to the changing security environment should be. 
Should it take the form of EU’s security and defence policy, as 
it is currently being shaped; or should it rather embrace a sub-
stantial reinforcement of the national armed forces in Europe, 
an increase in the European contribution to trans-Atlantic co-
operation within NATO, and an effective harmonisation of the 
European military cooperation projects, that should take also 
Central European needs into account, with the Alliance?
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I. Much ado abouT Pesco
In 2017 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) became the 
priority initiative within the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP),1 and was finally agreed upon in December. PESCO 
is intended to allow closer military cooperation among a group of 
willing EU member states who are ready to stick to a set of agreed 
commitments. After several months of discussions, twenty-five 
member states declared their participation in the initiative, i.e. 
all the EU members with the exceptions of the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Malta. 
Agreement on PESCO in this format marked a victory for an inclu-
sive political approach towards strengthening military coopera-
tion in the EU over the idea of creating an exclusive European mil-
itary vanguard. The participation of almost all the EU countries 
has led to less clear and binding commitments which its partici-
pants must meet. These include defence expenditure; cooperation 
in developing new military capabilities and making up the exist-
ing deficiencies; interoperability, availability and readiness to de-
ploy forces on CSDP missions and operations; and participation in 
the equipment programmes of the European Defence Agency (see 
Appendix 1). 
In December 2017 the member states participating in PESCO sub-
mitted a list of the first seventeen projects which they will jointly 
implement (see Appendix 2). At the moment, these represent ef-
forts to strengthen cooperation in narrowly defined areas, each of 
which has different sets of participants. The projects are divided 
into two categories. The first group is devoted to the operational 
1 The other initiatives are (1) the European Defence Fund (EDF), for funding 
multilateral armaments and R&D projects in the EU; (2) the Coordinated An-
nual Review on Defence (CARD), allowing the coordination of the develop-
ment of military capabilities in the member states; (3) Military Planning and 
Conduct Capability (MPCC), which is intended to lead EU military missions 
without an executive mandate (i.e. training missions).
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dimension; these projects are intended to improve participation 
in CSDP missions and operations (such as the EUFOR Crisis Re-
sponse Operation Core). The projects in the second group will sup-
port capability development (e.g. the project on maritime (semi-)
autonomous systems for mine countermeasures). The contribu-
tions of individual states and the nature of the projects show that 
PESCO is focused on crisis response in the southern neighbour-
hood of Europe. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are involved in 
the largest number of projects (9-16). The Central European mem-
ber states are involved in an average of 1 to 4 projects, similarly to 
the Nordic states (Sweden and Finland are participating in three 
projects each). From these two regions, only Lithuania and Slova-
kia are lead nations in two projects.
Summing up, PESCO does not seem to offer any definite incentives 
for the integration of the armed forces in the EU, or to contrib-
ute to the capability development to any great extent. Whether 
PESCO will provide added value to European security and de-
fence policy will depend on the will of the participating states to 
further develop the initiative and the European Commission’s de-
termination to enforce the commitments of PESCO. It is possible 
that PESCO will end up like the ‘pooling & sharing’ initiative from 
2011, which supported military cooperation in narrowly defined 
areas, but did not lead to a breakthrough in increasing military 
capabilities within the EU.
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II. GerMany, France, Poland: a TuG oF war
Even though the activation of PESCO was one element of a com-
mon, German-French initiative in 2016, the two countries had 
different visions regarding the development of this mechanism. 
Central Europe’s positions were basically overlooked in these dis-
cussions.
1. Germany: political objectives
Germany has remained reluctant to use military instruments for 
managing crises and conflicts, and has treated the development 
of military cooperation within the EU, including PESCO, above all 
in political terms. 
However, Germany wanted to give Paris a positive response to the 
French initiatives for closer European integration in at least one 
area, and to demonstrate the functionality of the Franco-German 
tandem in the EU. Moreover, Berlin wanted to show the new US 
administration that Europe was willing to take more responsibil-
ity for its security, and that it is able to invest more in military co-
operation. The domestic context was also important. The narrative 
of a ‘European Defence Union’ is more favourably accepted in Ger-
many than arguments on the need to strengthen NATO, which are 
unpopular due to anti-American sentiments in German society. 
From Berlin’s perspective, the question of tightening industrial co-
operation within the defence sector in the EU is also crucial, since 
it is viewed to be beneficial to German arms companies.
However, Germany essentially rejected the French ideas of creat-
ing an EU military vanguard on the basis of PESCO. Berlin did not 
want to create any formats that would bind it politically and mili-
tarily, obliging it to expand the Bundeswehr’s military involve-
ment in Africa or the Middle East. Germany was also opposed to 
creating additional divisions within the EU which would exclude 
the Central European member states. Within PESCO Germany 
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has proposed projects aimed at strengthening cooperation and 
capabilities in non-combat areas (such as medical support and lo-
gistics), which it had been offering to partners for years. In the 
end, Germany became a leading nation in four projects, and par-
ticipates in seven more (see Appendix 2). 
2. France: military ambitions 
France, for its part, favoured ambitious military objectives in de-
veloping the EU’s security and defence policy. The French aim in 
PESCO was clear: to strengthen the military capabilities of the 
member states involved, so they could conduct crisis management 
operations in the southern neighbourhood (Africa and the Middle 
East) using EU instruments, structures, and financial resources. 
Taking advantage of Brexit, as well as the Western European scep-
ticism towards US policy caused by the rhetoric of Donald Trump, 
Paris has brought about a desirable (from the French perspective) 
change in the direction of the European debates, from the topic 
of collective defence to the area of crisis management. In the EU’s 
negotiations over what form PESCO should take, however, Paris’s 
ideas have lost out to the German approach. France, an ardent ad-
vocate of PESCO, eventually became a lead nation in two projects, 
and is participating in only four.
Paris is not satisfied with the German-formatted PESCO, and has 
no greater hope that the EU will become an active and autono-
mously operating actor in security and defence in the short and 
medium term. Therefore the French President Emmanuel Macron 
put forward new proposals in September 2017 for the development 
of European military cooperation which correspond to France’s 
original ideas of how PESCO should work. In a speech at the Sor-
bonne, President Macron proposed the creation of a European In-
tervention Initiative (EII), which would be based on the creation 
of a joint military force, a common strategic culture & military 
doctrine, and joint budgetary instruments. The EII would be de-
ployed independently or within the framework of the EU, NATO 
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or the United Nations. This initiative was included in the French 
Strategic Review of Defence and National Security published last 
October by the French Ministry of Defence2. The European Inter-
vention Initiative is intended to complement France’s bilateral 
military cooperation with Germany and the UK3. This will most 
likely mean Paris’s increased cooperation with member states in 
southern Europe (including Spain and Italy), linking those states’ 
capabilities with French military potential. 
However, it is difficult to judge whether the EII will actually come 
to pass: at the moment Paris’s talks with European partners on 
the subject have brought no visible results. Regardless of the crea-
tion of the EII, France will continue to support the development of 
the CSDP’s instruments such as PESCO, CARD and EDF.
3. The scepticism of the eastern flank
The EU’s member states on the eastern flank have varying atti-
tudes towards the development of military cooperation within the 
EU. Those countries which feel threatened by Russian aggression 
and are members of NATO regard PESCO with scepticism. Poland, 
which is focused on strengthening collective defence and reform-
ing NATO’s structures, has expressed its concerns about the goals 
and direction of the initiative’s development most openly. It also 
2 The French Ministry of Defence, Revue stratégique: une analyse lucide et vo-
lontariste pour préparer la prochaine loi de programmation militaire, 4 De-
cember 2017, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/defence-policy/
strategic-review-of-defence-and-national-security-2017/strategic-review
3 Paris has realised the limitations of German security and defence policy; it 
is counting in the long term on a slow change in German strategic culture, 
and in the short term on greater Bundeswehr engagement in the southern 
neighbourhood, albeit not necessarily in a combat role (i.e. rather in trans-
port, training, arms supplies, medical support, etc.). In the case of the United 
Kingdom, Franco-British cooperation is based on the Lancaster House agree-
ment of 2010, as a result of which the two countries should strengthen their 
military cooperation and set up a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. This 
cooperation was confirmed in the course of the Franco-British summit in 
January 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-france-
summit-2018-documents 
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only joined the programme at the last moment (eventually partic-
ipating in two projects). Its concerns are related to PESCO’s single-
track formatting as an initiative which:
(1) is beneficial to the development of military capabilities mainly 
for crisis management operations, 
(2) is advantageous for the defence industry of the largest member 
states,
(3) concentrates on threats and challenges from the southern 
neighbourhood of Europe.4 
Similar doubts are shared by Romania and the Baltic states. The 
latter, due to their desire to maintain good relations with their 
Western European allies (Germany and France) which currently 
participate in NATO battlegroups on their territories, are less in-
clined to express their sceptical position in public.5  
For their part, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary identify 
with the eastern flank of NATO to a limited extent, and do not per-
ceive a direct military threat from Russia. They treat PESCO as an in-
strument which gives them the opportunity to stay close to Paris and 
Berlin in the face of their opposition to French and German proposals 
concerning the EU’s migration policy, among other matters.6 How-
ever, these states have also expressed concerns that the CSDP initia-
tives will duplicate NATO, and that Western European arms compa-
nies may dominate military-industrial cooperation within the EU.
4 See the joint letter from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and National De-
fence of Poland to Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy, of 13 November 2017.
5 In public Estonia expressed less scepticism, as it was holding the Presidency 
of the EU in the second half of 2017.
6 See J. Gotkowska, The CSDP’s renaissance. Challenges and opportunities for 
the eastern flank, OSW Commentary, 28 June 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-06-28/csdps-renaissance-challenges-
and-opportunities-eastern-flank 
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III. sTraTeGIc dIFFerences
It is obvious that the discussions about PESCO have a wider, stra-
tegic dimension. They revealed essential divergences among the 
EU member states related to perceptions of threats and challeng-
es, development of the EU’s security and defence policy, and the 
future of trans-Atlantic relations.
1. France: in pursuit of European emancipation
According to France, it is the EU’s volatile southern neighbour-
hood which poses the greatest risks and challenges (such as ter-
rorism), and so this should be a priority area for the EU’s actions 
in security and defence. As the US is, according to Paris, gradu-
ally withdrawing from political and military involvement in Eu-
rope, the EU should develop its own ‘strategic autonomy’, that is, 
the ability to undertake independent political and military action 
in security and defence policy. By that Paris has in mind devel-
oping crisis management but not collective defence capabilities. 
France is also focused on developing EU’s industrial autonomy, i.e. 
restricting the access of third countries (primarily the US) to the 
European defence market and strengthening the largest Western 
European arms companies.
France is de facto seeking to translate its security policy objec-
tives to the whole of the European Union. The EU (by means of 
the CSDP) should supplement France’s overstretched military ca-
pabilities and ability to maintain national strategic autonomy in 
terms of decision-making and conducting military operations in 
Africa and the Middle East. 
2. Germany: between the US and the EU
Germany still does not feel threatened, either by Russia or an 
unstable Africa and Middle East. Security and defence policy is 
far down the list of Berlin’s priorities. At the same time, most 
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German elites (in particular the Christian Democrats) are aware 
of their country’s dependence on US guarantees, both for Eu-
rope’s security and for the functioning of global trade, which 
is of essential importance to the German economy. That is why 
NATO is still considered the basis for both German and Euro-
pean security. 
Politically, however, the US under Donald Trump’s administration 
has adopted a diametrically opposite stance from that of Berlin in 
a number of key issues: multilateral international cooperation, 
trade, economy, climate change, energy and migration. Germany 
has thus begun to define the Trump presidency as a breakthrough 
in trans-Atlantic relations, and to discuss European ‘strategic au-
tonomy,’ understood as politico-military emancipation from the 
United States. A debate on the future of the partnership with 
Washington is currently underway in Germany; for the time be-
ing, this is taking place between trans-Atlantic and post-trans-
Atlantic-oriented experts.7 
However, some German politicians (from among the Social Demo-
crats) have also been sending the first signals suggesting a need 
to conceptualise a ‘new European foreign policy’, in which the EU 
would take the change in the strategic relationship with the US 
into account.8 
7 In Spite of It All, America: A Trans-Atlantic Manifesto in Times of Donald 
Trump – a German Perspective, The New York Times, 11 October 2017; https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/world/europe/germany-united-states-
trump-manifesto.html, J. Lau, B. Ulrich, Something New in the West, Die 
Zeit, 25 October 2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/2017-10/foreign-policy-
germany-atlanticism-relationships-values 
8 See the speech by Sigmar Gabriel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany at the Conference of the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, 
Europe in a less comfortable world, 5 December 2017, https://www.auswaer-
tiges-amt.de/en/Newsroom/berliner-forum-aussenpolitik/909376
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3. Poland, the Baltic states and Romania: the ‘trans-
Atlanticists’
In the security and defence policies of the member states on the 
EU’s eastern flank (Poland, the Baltic states and Romania), cen-
tre stage is occupied by NATO and relations with the US, the ally 
which has the greatest military capabilities and the will to use 
them. The region does not see a problem with the disengagement 
of the United States from Europe: on the contrary, it is the ben-
eficiary of a substantially increased US military presence on the 
continent.
Poland has become a hub for the US Army’s activity for the whole 
eastern flank, with around 5000 soldiers being stationed in the 
country. The US military presence in Poland includes units of a ro-
tational armoured brigade combat team and the combat aviation 
brigade as part of the US’s European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) 
and the US-led battlegroup as part of NATO deterrence policy. 
Relations with the US, which the region sees mostly through the 
prism of security and energy policy (due to the deliveries of LNG 
from the US and Washington’s opposition to Nord Stream 2), have 
never been so intensive. For this reason, the ongoing discussions 
in Western Europe on the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ are incompre-
hensible to the countries on the eastern flank.
Moreover, the region’s focus on collective defence does not mean 
that it does not recognise the need to become involved in crisis 
management operations in the south; however, the question of 
the formula for this engagement is being raised. Both Poland9 and 
9 Since July 2016 Poland has participated in the global coalition’s activities 
against ISIS. Four Polish F-16 planes (with around 150 soldiers) have been 
conducting reconnaissance flights over Syria and Iraq from bases in Kuwait; 
Polish special forces (around 60 soldiers) has been training Iraqi military 
in Iraq, and a Polish team of logistics officers (about 20 soldiers) has been 
training Iraqi technical personnel how to maintain their post-Soviet military 
equipment. The latter (which is likely to be expanded) will become part of 
NATO’s planned training mission in Iraq.
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the Baltic states are increasing their presence in the Middle East 
within the US-led global coalition against ISIS as well as NATO’s 
efforts, for reasons including pressure from the Trump adminis-
tration and showing solidarity with the southern allies.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
2/
20
18
16
IV. narraTIVes on euroPean deFence
1. The concept of ‘strategic autonomy’
The concept	of	the EU’s	‘strategic	autonomy’ as used in discus-
sions on European defence has caused by far the greatest contro-
versy. In the Global strategy of the European Union, the document 
which forms the basis of the latest initiatives in the CSDP, this 
term is defined as autonomy regarding external crisis manage-
ment and capacity-building. In addition, NATO is named as the 
primary framework for collective defence.10 
The strategy thus offers a limited definition of the concept of ‘stra-
tegic autonomy’. However, this is contrary to the ordinary under-
standing of the term, which in discussions within Western Eu-
rope denotes the EU’s full independence of the US in security and 
defence. At the same time, this narrative completely neglects the 
question of how to develop EU’s military capabilities in collective 
defence. It also avoids the question of Brexit, which is problem-
atic as the UK has one of the largest military potential in Europe. 
The fact that London will not participate in the development of 
the CSDP makes NATO the most important platform of military 
cooperation with the UK. 
Moreover, a significant gap between political rhetoric and mili-
tary reality is apparent, and often ignored in discussions in West-
ern Europe. In the short and medium term, the EU’s member 
states will not be able to conduct either intensive crisis manage-
ment operations in the southern neighbourhood, or collective de-
fence operations in the event of a conventional attack on one of 
the member countries. PESCO, presented in this narrative as one 
of the instruments for achieving ‘strategic autonomy’, will hardly 
10 A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 
pp. 19-20, June 2016, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-
promote-citizens-interests
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yield a significant improvement in Europe’s military capabilities, 
as described above.
2. ‘The US’s withdrawal from Europe’
Equally problematic is the Western European perception of 
Washington’s security and defence policy through the prism of 
President Trump’s rhetoric, and not through the US’s strategy and 
military activity. This approach has resulted in a narrative	of	the	
United	States	withdrawing	from	Europe. 
At least in the short term, this narrative is currently at odds with 
reality. Firstly, the US military presence in Europe has in fact 
been enhanced both within NATO and within the European De-
terrence Initiative, starting with the non-allied Sweden and Fin-
land, through the Baltic states and Poland, up to Romania and Bul-
garia. Secondly, the administrations of both Barack Obama and 
Donald Trump have increased funding for the EDI (US$3.4 billion 
in 2017, up to US$4.8 billion in 2018 and a planned figure of US$6.5 
billion in 2019). Thirdly, the US’s 2018 National Defense Strategy 
sees the central challenge in the re-emergence of long-term, stra-
tegic competition by revisionist powers – China and Russia.11 This 
is an important change in US defence policy, which after 2001 was 
focused on the fight against international terrorism. 
In the long term, questions about the US military presence in 
Europe are justified, given the changes in the global balance of 
power affecting the external priorities and the changing domes-
tic politics in the US. These considerations should be taken into 
account in the long-term national defence planning in Europe. 
However, the current discussions about EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ 
11 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Com-
petitive Edge, 19 January 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/
Article/1419045/dod-official-national-defense-strategy-will-rebuild-domi-
nance-enhance-deterrence/
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as an answer to this dilema are in fact deepening the gap in trans-
Atlantic relations. They imply that Western European countries 
are starting to take the trans-Atlantic divisions for granted, and 
to look beyond the US-EU strategic relationship instead of think-
ing of how to reinvigorate and strengthen relations with Wash-
ington. This may send the wrong signals to the US, and in the long 
term could boost scepticism as to the legitimacy of its military in-
volvement in Europe. 
Furthermore, if the EU becomes the main organisation for mili-
tary crisis management for the Western European allies (with 
France as the leading state), and NATO is more and more margin-
alised as an alliance maintained solely for the purpose of the col-
lective defence of its Central European allies, Washington could 
end up losing interest in NATO as a platform for trans-Atlantic 
cooperation.
3. Debate as a substitute for action
For some countries, the discussions	about	 strengthening	Eu-
ropean	 security	 and	 defence	 policy	 are	 becoming	 a	 substi-
tute	for	taking	meaningful	action	in	this	regard. Focusing on 
discussions about European defence diverts attention away from 
questions of investment in the national armed forces, and towards 
a debate about political projects. This is beneficial in particular 
for those countries less willing to increase their defence spending 
and military engagement abroad. This primarily applies to Berlin, 
which specialises in ambitious rhetoric and has declared its read-
iness to ‘assume the responsibility for European security’. At the 
same time, it is reluctant to invest in the Bundeswehr and to get 
it too involved, either on the EU’s eastern flank (in collective de-
fence) or in the southern neighbourhood (in crisis management).
PESCO is a prime example of the German approach. Berlin is hap-
py to have negotiated a relatively unambitious cooperation for-
mat which it can deploy politically, at little cost, as the German 
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and European contribution to strengthening European security 
in discussions about trans-Atlantic burden sharing without be-
ing bound militarily by too strict commitments. At the same time, 
the German defence expenditure will not exceed 1.3% of GDP by 
2021 (in accordance with the new coalition agreement).12 This is 
far too little for the Bundeswehr as it struggles with a large deficit 
of arms and military equipment, as well as the problem of main-
taining operational readiness (the Bundeswehr would most likely 
need at least a month to put up one brigade, while the structure of 
the German land forces nominally includes three divisions).
JUStyna	GotkowSka
12 Germany’s defence budget for the years 2017-2021 will be gradually increased 
from €37 billion in 2017 to €42.29 billion euros in 2021, in accordance with 
the current mid-term federal financial plans. According to the new coalition 
agreement, the additional increase in spending (most likely up to €1 billion by 
2021) will depend on the budgetary situation, and will be tied to an increase 
in official development assistance.
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aPPendIx 1. Pesco: rules oF ParTIcIPaTIon
(1)	Participation.	Ultimately only three EU countries will remain 
outside PESCO: Denmark, because of its opt-out from the CSDP; 
Malta, which has indicated a potential collision between its par-
ticipation in PESCO and the neutrality enshrined in its constitu-
tion; and the United Kingdom, due to the upcoming Brexit. Ire-
land and Portugal joined PESCO after the other 23 EU member 
states issued a notification of their intention to participate in the 
framework in November 2017.13 
(2)	 Commitments.14 PESCO’s commitments are largely general, 
and can be interpreted so that both those member states which 
favour greater military integration in the EU and those countries 
which are more sceptical can find arguments which suit them-
selves. This includes involvement in the coordinated annual re-
view on defence, or investing in undeveloped capabilities in ac-
cordance with the EU’s capability development plan. 
A more binding commitment is the requirement to participate in 
at least one capability development project identified as strategi-
cally relevant. In addition, member states participating in PESCO 
agree to substantially contribute to the EU Battlegroups (EUBG), 
to provide substantial support to CSDP missions and operations, 
and to work on a common funding of military CSDP operations. 
A similarly general formulation is contained in the section con-
cerning participation in the EDA’s equipment programmes. The 
commitments regarding military expenditure contain no refer-
ences to the allocation of 2% of GDP to defence budgets. The only 
13 European Council of the European Union, Defence cooperation: 23 member 
states sign a joint notification on the Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO), 13 November 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2017/11/13/defence-cooperation-23-member-states-sign-
joint-notification-on-pesco/
14 See also M. Terlikowski, PESCO: consequences for the unity of the EU defence 
policy, 17 November 2017, PISM Bulletin #112 (1554), https://www.pism.pl/
publikacje/biuletyn/nr-112-1554
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reference is to the regular increase of defence budgets in real 
terms and the allocation of 20% of total defence spending for in-
vestment expenditure, and of 2% of defence budgets on research 
and development. 
Every year the states participating in PESCO are supposed to pre-
sent national implementation plans for the fulfilment of the com-
mitments to all the participants and to the PESCO Secretariat; 
these will be evaluated by the latter. The Foreign Affairs Council 
in its ‘PESCO format’ may suspend member states which do not 
fulfil the criteria. A review of PESCO’s commitments is due to take 
place in 2025.
(3)	PESCo’s	governance.	The governance of PESCO will primar-
ily be the responsibility of the member states, although the High 
Representative and the subordinated structures will have the op-
portunity to influence the development of the initiative. A joint 
Foreign Affairs Council/Defence meeting (in which only the coun-
tries participating in PESCO will have the right to vote) will deal 
with PESCO issues at the strategic level twice a year. 
At the lower level, the participating member states may propose 
any projects they wish (albeit in accordance with the commit-
ments they have signed up to). The High Representative will for-
mulate recommendations on their acceptance or rejection, based 
on an assessment by the PESCO Secretariat.15 However, the mem-
ber states alone will ultimately determine which joint projects 
will be accepted. The extent and the principles of cooperation 
within the framework of specific projects will be unanimously 
decided only by the states participating in them.
15 The PESCO Secretariat will be built on the basis of the cooperation between 
the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), 
the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the deputy secretary-general for the 
CSDP and emergency response.
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(4)	Projects. In December 2017 the states participating in PESCO 
adopted a declaration of the first 17 projects which will be car-
ried out within this framework. The projects are led by the lead 
nations; several member states participate in them in different 
groupings, and several others have observer status. Projects on 
the operational dimension include: European medical command, 
military mobility, a network of logistic hubs, a competence centre 
for training missions, a centre of training certification for armies, 
a strategic command system for missions and operations, a cri-
sis response operations centre. Projects concerning the capabil-
ity development include: secure radio communication, (semi-)
autonomous mine-countermeasures systems, maritime surveil-
lance systems, an information sharing platform for cyber inci-
dents, mutual assistance in cyber security, and the development 
of a common platform for various kinds of armoured vehicles, and 
indirect fire support. Further projects may be attached to these 
after a few months. 
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